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Social or Special Interests:  
How Unions Influence Spending 
 
Devon Moffett & Shauna Reilly 
Northern Kentucky University 
 
Abstract: Unions are in a decades long decline, heading for the point of non-relevance. To better 
understand what this change will entail, this paper asks: how does union strength affect state 
spending? Previous research on unions has exhausted the answers to national and congressional 
effects, so looking at spending on the state and local level will add more clarity to our understanding 
of union influence. Independent data were used to test several areas of spending with multivariate 
regressions. Additionally, pairwise comparisons tested whether union influence differs across 
areas. It was found that unions have a positive influence on spending independent of the Democratic 
Party, and do not have even effects across areas of spending. 
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Unions have experienced a continuous decline in 
membership since their peak in the 1950s. With the well 
documented effects of right-to-work laws on union membership 
(i.e. Raymond, Shulman, & Weiler, 2004) in combination with 
historic trends, this suggests that they may disappear altogether. 
Despite this possibility, unions have thus far remained an 
influential political player, even increasing their political action 
committee (PAC) contributions over time (Masters & Atkin, 
1996). In light of this decline, it is important to investigate how 
unions are influencing our society in order to better understand 
what their absence would entail. Congressional level and 
legislative effects (or lack thereof) have been heavily explored 
(Masters & Delaney, 2005), but substantially less analysis has 
been paid to how unions affect lower levels of government or 
what their presence means for public expenditures. As such, this 
paper will confront the following question: How does union 
strength affect state and local expenditures? 
To answer this question, it must first be understood how 
unions are using their political influence. There are three primary 
explanations in the literature, each of which are explored in this 
paper. Of the three, the social-interest school is identified as both 
the most convincing theory of union political influence as well 
as the most promising for future research. Using this as a starting 
point, this study hypothesized that 1. increasing union strength 
will increase social expenditures, 2. that this effect will be 
independent of party control, and that 3. the effect will be even 
across types of expenditures. A series of regressions on different 
areas of public expenditures were then used to test these 
hypotheses. The first two hypotheses have nuanced support, with 
their basic assertions being true, but with certain exceptions 
being raised. The final hypothesis, on the other hand, came to a 
puzzling conclusion which provides questions for future 
research. With these conclusions in mind, it is easy to see that 
the continued decline of unions will have a serious influence on 
the future of state public expenditures. 
 
Literature Review 
In response to the question of how unions are using their 
political influence, there are three main bodies of scholarship. 
The first perspective, and for a long time most popular, is that of 
the pluralist school, whose scholars present the conclusion that 
unions work like any other interest group and would only have 
incentive to influence public spending if that spending would 
directly benefit union members (Barash, 1947; Freeman & 
Murdoff, 1985; Masters, 1998). The second view is that of the 
Democratic coalition school, which argues that unions in the 
United States have become so engrained in the Democratic 
coalition that their political influence is exclusively expressed 
through the Democratic Party (Greenstone, 1969; Dark, 2001; 
Francia, 2010). The final current of thought is that of the social-
interest school, a recent addition to the literature that argues that 
unions have started to direct their independent political influence 




Scholars of the pluralist school begin from the 
straightforward assumption that unions work similar to other 
interest groups, competing with other interest groups to achieve 
narrow and specific political goals that secure special advantages 
for their members. In this view, unions will primarily support 
public expenditures only when their membership can derive a 
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direct benefit from said expenditures (Barash, 1947; Delaney, 
1991). It is possible for unions to affect broader areas of public 
expenditures, but they will only do so when pursuing ties with 
other groups who will increase labor’s ability to secure its special 
interests (Masters, 1998). 
The early development of this school of thought can be seen 
through Barash (1947), who used historical examples to 
characterize unions as a group which only turns to politics when 
its familiar strategy of collective bargaining cannot secure its 
interests. Unions would therefore only attempt to influence 
social spending to raise their wages, and only when they could 
not achieve that by strike or boycott. The application of this early 
thought to the present day can be seen in the work of Bennett and 
Taylor (2001), who argued that unions exist exclusively to 
secure a series of benefits and protections for workers and that 
the continuous decline of union strength is indicative of unions 
having stabilized workers’ interests and rights to the degree that 
they are no longer important for workers.  
Scholarship in this school can trace its more modern roots 
back to the seminal work of Freeman and Murdoff (1984). When 
writing on the political power of unions, the authors 
characterized unions as a tragicomic special interest group that, 
while primarily looking to preserve its monopoly powers, has 
only seen legislation that it favors pass if it has been of a more 
“social” nature. Even the success of this social legislation is 
through “no virtue of their own”, as the authors showed with 
specific legislative examples that such bills passed not by labor 
efforts, but rather by existing sentiments in the electorate or in 
Congress. The low success rate of unions is a recurring theme in 
this literature, although Delaney’s exploration (1991) found that 
at times specific political efforts were able to secure legislation 
that advantaged unions. A case study of the Communication 
Workers of America (CWA) also reinforced the perspective of 
unions as a narrow interest group, as the application of 
organization theory showed that the CWA was simultaneously 
using collective bargaining, politics, and organization to secure 
a private advantage for its membership (Katz, Batt, & Keefe, 
2003). Those who ascribe to the pluralist school have also been 
careful to make the distinction between labor using the 
Democratic Party and being a part of it, as can be seen in an 
exploration of the 1978 House elections that concluded that party 
was incidental to member’s voting records when predicting 
union support (Gopoian, Smith, & Smith, 1984). 
The most recent scholarship in this tradition has carefully 
incorporated literature showing unions’ influence on areas that 
do not provide a union advantage. An example of this is present 
in Masters’ (1998) examination of the AFSCME, where he 
presented the idea of unions engaging in interest group alliances 
to achieve their purposes. Nevertheless, he pointed out that both 
the contributions and official positions of the AFSCME support 
the fact that their reason for being is their members. Asher’s 
(2001) extensive contribution took an overall similar approach, 
explaining that while unions are too complex to follow a single 
strategy, ultimately, they are primarily looking out for special 
interests. An example he cited of this being the strategy that the 
AFL-CIO’s then recently elected president, Sweeney, adopted 
when opposing permanent normal trade relations with China. 
Labor was willing to form coalitions to oppose the measure, but 
ultimately their opposition was rooted in their special interests. 
When later looking at labor’s campaign efforts in 2000, Masters 
(2004) returned with the claim that the bottom line of union 
effectiveness is in how its actions affect membership, as that is 
its primary interest. 
Critics of the pluralist school have claimed that its 
constituent scholars have too quickly concluded that there is no 
social orientation of unions from separate research where 
comparativists discredit class orientation (Coleman, 1988; 
Radcliff & Saiz, 1998). Their evidence of this rested in the 
success of unions in achieving broader social aims, both in the 
form of legislation and expenditures. Pluralists can reply with 
the theory of interest group coalitions, but it remains difficult to 
discredit findings of union influence on non-union interests. 
Another criticism is based on whether or not unions are really 
independent enough of the Democratic Party to act as a usual 
social group. While scholars of the pluralist school have made 
claims of independence, the overwhelming disparity in union 
support for Democrats compared to Republicans even following 
events like the passage of NAFTA has suggested that unions may 
not have much of a choice of who to support (Masters & 
Zardkoohi, 1986; Dark, 2003). 
 
Democratic Coalition School 
The body of scholarship following the Democratic coalition 
school focuses on the relationship between the Democratic Party 
and labor in order to explain what political influence unions may 
have. These scholars vary in the degree to which they can 
imagine unions affecting the policies of the Democratic Party 
either as a matter of desire or ability, but almost unanimously 
agree that if unions were to affect public expenditures, they 
would need to do it exclusively through the mechanisms of the 
party they have aligned with (Greenstone, 1969; Dark, 2001). As 
such, unions may affect public expenditures, but it is through the 
Democratic Party that they do so. 
The origin of this perspective might be found in the 
influential work of Greenstone (1969), who is often cited for his 
contributions in understanding the relationship between the 
Democratic Party and organized labor. He presented unions as 
having assumed an integral part in the Democratic Party, 
aggregating political demands of other groups rather than acting 
primarily as an interest group seeking special advantages. The 
result of this was a dependence on the Democrats that made labor 
into a nationwide electoral organization for the Democratic 
Party. Evidence of this dependence can be seen in research 
showing that unions invariably prefer Democrats in their PAC 
allocations despite claims of nonpartisanship (Masters & 
Zardkoohi, 1986). Amenta and Poulsen (1996) explored state-
level outcomes for New Deal social spending programs, and 
their findings were consistent with Greenstone’s assertions. 
Labor was willing to help with New Deal programs, despite 
worries that some programs would undercut union members’ 
wages, because of the strong Democrat-labor alliance.  
https://encompass.eku.edu/kjus/vol5/iss1/7




More recent investigations from this school have shown that 
despite the challenges of general union decline and the Reagan 
presidency, the labor-Democratic party alliance continues to 
characterize the political influence of unions (Dark, 1996; 
Francia, 2010). Using the close relationship between the AFL-
CIO and the Speaker Wright in the 1980s as an example, Dark 
claimed that the Democratic Party relies on unions and, in return, 
unions can only advance their own interests through the 
Democratic Party. Dark (2000) presented further proof of this 
reliance in the “energetic” efforts of unions to elect Democrats 
in the 1998 elections. This perspective is expanded in his book 
where Dark (2001) continued to engage with the seeming 
paradox of declining labor membership and intensifying political 
action. He resolved this paradox through examination of the 
symbiotic relationship between labor lobbyists and 
Congressional Democrats. Democrats, he explained, view 
unions as the lynchpin of social reconstruction, but unions only 
achieve success when it fits into wider political decision making. 
Dark (2003) also contributed an understanding of the nature of 
labor’s inclusion in the two-party system with an examination of 
their bargaining strategies. While unions can technically break 
party lines, and in about 4% of endorsements do so, actually 
defecting is not a serious strategy that unions can employ. As 
such, any influence that they have must be almost entirely 
expressed through the Democratic Party. This tradition of 
thinking is still strong, as can be seen in Francia’s (2010) 
interpretation of labor as a campaign and electoral arm of the 
Democratic Party when considering PAC contributions. 
Critics of this school consider the labor-Democratic alliance 
to be overstated, citing research showing that unions are attentive 
almost exclusively to voting records rather than party affiliation 
(Gopoian, Smith, & Smith, 1984). Democratic coalition scholars 
can answer this by pointing out the disparity in endorsements, 
but the fact remains that unions have been willing to endorse 
Republicans when they can count on them to support union 
legislation. Additionally, researchers who have included both 
party and union strength into their models are quick to point out 
that unions have an independent effect, which is hard for this 
school to explain (Radcliff & Saiz, 1998). When unions affect 
policy liberalism in the absence of Democratic Party control, it 
is hard not to conclude that they must have some wider options 
for influencing politics. 
 
Social-Interest School 
Those who support the social-interest school argue that 
while unions undeniably are concerned with the interests of their 
membership, unions have adopted broader social goals that now 
characterize their political action (Coleman, 1988; Albert, 2014). 
From this assumption, these scholars concluded that unions will 
influence all areas of public expenditures, even those in which 
union members have no direct stake. They will do so because 
they are acting out of social-interests rather than the special-
interests suggested by earlier scholars. 
An early example of this literature (which seems to have 
evolved out of even earlier, now mostly abandoned, conceptions 
of American unions as vehicles of class struggle) can be seen in 
the arguments of Coleman (1988). Using ALF-CIO policies as 
evidence, he made the case that unions have transitioned from 
their formative interest group years into a social movement. 
They have gained influence through cultivating an alliance with 
all disenfranchised low-wage workers, including those who are 
not unionized, and are now obligated to advocate for the broader 
interests of that group. This is a conclusion commonly echoed by 
scholars of this school, such as Radcliff and Saiz (1998), who 
found that unions seem to have an interest in all areas where 
lower-class citizens have a great public stake; furthermore, they 
used pooled time series data from 1964 - 1982 to show that 
unions had a systematic effect on policy liberalism divorced 
from effects of the Democratic Party. Looking at “veto actor” 
responses to globalization, Ha (2008) found a strong union effect 
on welfare spending, which further argues for the concept of 
unions as agents pushing for social interests. Another approach 
within this school was to look union actions through the 
perspective of public goods theory, suggesting that union 
members are both providers and consumers of public goods, 
which will result in unions positively affecting the provision of 
public goods even in areas where there are no special benefits for 
union members (Marlow & Orzechowski, 1996).  
Scholars of this school have also contributed to the body of 
literature on union revitalization – the catch-all term for the 
efforts of unions to reverse the current trends of decline and 
stagnation. It is argued that revitalized unions are more likely to 
take part in broad social issues rather than pursuer narrow special 
interests. An example of this argument is found in Albert’s 
(2014) findings that revitalized unions actually take part in more 
hearings on broad social issues than they do hearings on core 
labor issues, in comparison to historic examples which showed 
inverse results. 
A major critique of this school, however, can be found in the 
work of Burstein and Linton (2002), whose efforts in tabulating 
research showed that scholars tend only to prove the direct 
impact of organizations about 50% of the time. Some of their 
suggestions for why this could be the case include the systematic 
overestimation of organization effects and the use of 
organization resources rather than actions to measure influence. 
It is easy to see how these criticisms could be leveled at social 
interest research such as that of Radcliff and Saiz, whose 
measurements of union effects were focused on density. 
Nevertheless, scholars of this school would point to the 
consensus between qualitative analyses of political actions such 
as Albert’s tallies of union participation in hearings and 
quantitative analyses using union resources in defense of their 
methodologies. An additional criticism of this school lies in the 
contradiction between unions being a broad alliance of 
disenfranchised workers alongside the clear decline of union 
strength (Freeman & Murdoff, 1985). Scholars of the social-
interest school would respond to this argument by pointing to the 
continued political influence of unions despite lower 
membership, especially in light of the revitalization strategies. 
Despite these criticisms, the social-interest school remains 
the most promising current of thought for future research for a 
number of reasons, not the least because of the limited amount 
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of literature on it. Its ability to describe the recent revitalization 
actions of unions as well as demonstrated union influences on 
broad public policy matters are also strong points in its favor. In 
contrast the pluralist school is limited as a result of its conception 
of unions as serving the primary purpose of achieving special 
benefits, especially when considered alongside literature that 
suggests their inability to truly protect their monopoly powers. 
The Democratic coalition school is similarly limited in that it 
restricts the union world of political action within the party 
system, causing it to have inadequate responses to findings of 
independent union effects. 
Theory 
At its base, the social-interest school asserts that unions use 
their political influence to attain broad social goals. Unions that 
are acting in this way would therefore be expected to increase 
public spending in a variety of areas, including those where 
union members did not directly benefit. As actors pursuing these 
social goals, they would also be expected to have an independent 
effect when accounting for other institutions. Finally, unions 
from this perspective would be expected to their influence evenly 
to achieve desired amounts of public goods. These conclusions 
lead to the following three hypotheses: 
H1. If there is an increase in union strength in a state, then 
there will be an increase in the amount of social wealth that goes 
into various areas of public spending in that state. 
The scholarship of the social-interest school places its 
foundation upon the assumption that unions will influence public 
policy towards the social interest. Previous researchers have 
supported this assumption with a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative findings which have tied union strength and 
involvement with public spending and policy liberalism. This 
hypothesis is meant to test this underlying assumption across a 
broader number of expenditures. It is expected that the greater 
strength that unions have in a state, the more that state will be 
influenced to allocate wealth to social expenditures. This result 
would be consistent with previous findings of the relationship 
between unions and spending, including those of the pluralist 
school, and would be the natural result of unions whose political 
influence is directed towards social rather than exclusive ends. 
While this model relies on the assumption that unions will use 
additional resources if available, previous findings of 
significance using similar conceptions of union strength suggest 
that this assumption is not unfounded.  
H2. If there is an increase in union strength in a state, then 
there will be an independent marginal effect on the amount of 
social wealth going into public spending even when accounting 
for the influence of the Democratic Party. 
This second hypothesis is in response to the Democratic 
coalition school’s suggestions that if unions are to affect public 
policy, they will have to do so through their symbiotic 
relationship with the Democratic Party. While scholarship in the 
social-interest school has yet to demonstrate a completely 
independent union effect across several types of public 
expenditures, there have been findings which distinguished 
between the two. With these findings in mind, it is expected that 
unions will have statistically significant effects even after the full 
influence of the Democratic Party has been accounted for. This 
marginal effect would be the clear result of unions exerting 
independent political influence to expand public spending. 
H3. If there is an increase in union strength, then there will 
be a proportional increase in all areas of public expenditure. 
Thus far scholars in the pluralist school have been able to 
explain possible union effects as a natural result of unions 
maintaining coalitions to secure their interests. Such a 
conclusion is in direct contention with the social-interest 
argument that unions have instead act on a broader social stance. 
The function of this hypothesis is to resolve this disagreement. 
The thought is that if unions are merely contributing to other 
social causes in return for future support, any influence that they 
have over less beneficial expenditures would be smaller than 
over areas from which unions directly benefit. Why, after all, 
would unions (when conceived of as special interest groups) 
bother expending their influence if they did not receive more in 
return than they could accomplish on their own? It is instead 
expected unions will have a relatively uniform effect on social 
expenditures; if unions are acting primarily on behalf of broad 
social objectives instead of narrow special interests, they have 
little reason to prioritize one area over another. 
 
Method 
The data in this study pertained to all fifty states and 
Washington D.C. and was taken from a variety of primary 
sources. Regarding the dependent variables, the US Census 
Bureau was used exclusively with the Public Education Finances 
Report being used to find per-pupil education expenditures and 
the State & Local Finances Report being used to extract spending 
on the following areas: public welfare, hospitals, highways, 
housing and community development, and unemployment 
compensation. These areas were selected to provide types of 
expenditures where union members could conceivably receive a 
direct and exclusive benefit in the form of wages or jobs 
(education, hospitals, health), a strategic benefit when 
bargaining with employers (unemployment compensation), or a 
social, non-exclusive benefit in the form of public goods (public 
welfare, highways, and housing and community development). 
Analyzing the effects of union strength across these different 
areas would provide a clear picture of what, if anything, unions 
prioritized when influencing social spending. Furthermore, it 
was decided to analyze the combination of state and local 
expenditures rather than just one or the other to capture the total 
possible influence of unions within a state.  
After being collected, the different areas were then 
converted to 2009 dollars in order to match the gross state 
product (GSP) data taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). The areas of expenditure were then divided by the GSP 
of each state and multiplied by one-hundred, yielding a 
percentage which is hereafter referred to as the “amount of social 
wealth” allocated in a state. This transformation was necessary 
to present expenditures in terms of relative social spending. 
Previously chosen methods that examine proportions of public 
spending such as that used by Marlow and Orzechowski (1996) 
treat public spending as if 10% of the budget of a rich, fiscally 
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conservative state is equivalent to 10% of the budget of a poor 
state with expansive social programs. What is instructive when 
looking at relative social expenditures is therefore less the 
proportion of a state budget and more the average wealth per 
person which is going towards social expenditures. 
In terms of the explanatory variables, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics was used to derive data on union density (DENSITY) 
and unemployment (UNEM); furthermore, an indicator variable 
for the presence of right to work laws (RTW with 1 coded as the 
presence of such a law) was derived from the National 
Conference of State Legislatures website. Together union 
density and unemployment were conceived of as union strength. 
As discussed earlier, there has been some criticism of looking at 
the effects of social groups using only their available resources 
(Paul & Linton, 2002); however, union density remains a 
descriptive proxy variable for union strength in a given state as 
membership inevitably provides a limiting factor on the ability 
of unions to influence politics either through mobilization or 
spending. Similarly, right to work laws capture unions’ ability to 
draw strength from non-members and as such provides a picture 
of the rest of unions’ available resources in a state.2 
Unemployment was included to control for the impact of outside 
economic effects on expenditures. 
As mentioned, GSP per capita data (GSP) was taken from 
the BEA. Its inclusion controlled for a natural increase or decline 
in proportional social spending as relative wealth increased. 
Control of state legislatures was derived from the Nation 
Conference of State Legislatures, which detailed which party 
controlled the upper house, lower house, and governorship of 
each state in each year. This data has been coded into an indicator 
variable (DEM) where 1 shows that the Democratic Party had 
control over both houses and the governorship and 0 shows that 
they had lost control of at least one house or the governorship. 
This method was decided upon from a small pool of alternatives3 
through a series of preliminary regressions which showed the 
chosen coding to have the greatest explanatory power; it was 
selected in this way as its main purpose was to isolate the 
independent influence of unions, and the measurement with the 
highest explanatory power would do the best job of doing so. 
Additionally, an interaction between union density and this 
indicator variable was included in order to see whether union 
strength and Democratic control had complementary effects; it 
was necessary for the analysis of the second hypothesis that such 
codependent effects be separated from independent influence.  
In order to avoid potential autocorrelation problems with the 
use of panel data, a time variable was also included. Finally, an 
indicator variable was included for before and after the 2008 
                                                          
2 While these two variables add some collinearity to the model 
(VIF = 1.9) and their interaction term even more so, they are 
descriptive enough that the inclusion of both is warranted. 
3 These include coding 1 as the Democrats either holding both 
houses or holding the governorship, adding split legislatures to 
the coding of 1, and lagged values of each measurement. 
4 There were a few states that exhibited consistently high 
studentized residuals, but auxiliary regressions showed that 
recession (REC). It was included after some early graphical 
analyses showed that the influence of union strength may have 
changed whenever expenditures started to fall in real terms rather 
than increase as they had in the preceding period. An interaction 
effect between this variable and union density was also included 
in the event that the recession changed the slope as well as the 
intercept of the relationship. 
To test for a relationship between unions and public 
expenditures, a series of OLS regressions were run on the 
mentioned areas of public spending. The explanatory variables 
of union density, right to work laws, the interaction between the 
two, unemployment, Democratic control, the time variable, the 
recession indicator, the two interaction terms, and GSP were 
used to explain the variability of state public expenditures. The 
estimated coefficients for the marginal effects of union strength 
and their significance were intended to make it clear how unions 
are using their influence and whether this influence is 
independent of the Democratic Party.  
The final hypothesis was tested using a number of pairwise 
comparisons; these analyses were intended to compare the 
relative effect of unions across different types of expenditures. It 
was decided to use pairwise comparisons rather than a single 
group comparison in order to see where union influence was 
different if it existed. To accomplish this, the social wealth 
percentages created earlier were standardized in order to 
represent proportional effects of union strength. The data for one 
type of expenditure was then appended to the end of the data for 
spending of another type. Following this, the independent 
variables that were used in the main regressions were copied for 
both data series. An indicator variable was subsequently created, 
which served the purpose of denoting which data represented 
which expenditures. Finally, an interaction term between union 
density and this indicator was included. The significance and 
sign of this interaction would show whether there was a 
significant difference in the affect that unions had on each area. 
 
Results 
The results of the regressions on the seven different areas of 
public expenditures are shown in Table 1.4 All of the regressions 
themselves were statistically significant, although the model 
underperformed when explaining health expenditures. For every 
regression at least one and often two of the components of union 
strength were significant, and in all cases unions displayed a 
positive influence on public expenditures, confirming the 
predictions of the first hypothesis. Furthermore, they do so in the 
presence of Democratic control variables affirming the basic 
precept of the second hypothesis that union strength has an 
their presence was not driving the relationships found. As such, 
they have remained in the model so that results apply to all 
states plus Washington D.C. Graphical examinations of 
assumed normality and equal variance otherwise showed no 
signs of major concern for most models. White’s general test 
confirmed some heteroskedasticity in areas of expenditure such 
as highways. No transformation was undertaken so that 
coefficients could still be easily compared. 
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independent influence. In the instances that the interaction 
between union density and right to works laws was significant, 
it can be seen that the presence of a right to work law at the very 
least nullifies union influence (as in the case of education) and 
in most cases reverses the influence of union density. One 
possible reason for this is that the multicollinearity between the 
RTW variable and its interaction variable resulted in the latter 
subsuming all of the influence of such a law beyond its direct 
impact on union strength. Another possible explanation is that in 
states without right to work laws unions have had a cumulative 
effect on public expenditures that dissipates in states that have 
such legislation. 
Also, interesting are the cases in which the RTW variable 
displays an explanatory power either equally strong or stronger 
than union density. In the instance of unemployment, the 
variable has the predicted effect of reducing public spending as 
a result of decreasing union strength (that unions only appear to 
influence unemployment spending in interaction with 
Democratic control here can be explained as there being a 
relatively inflexible floor on unemployment spending that only 
Democratic legislatures are willing to raise, and only when under 
pressure from unions to do so). The sign of the effects on housing 
and hospitals seems peculiar. However, why would union 
density and the presence of a right to work law increase public 
spending, but the interaction between the two result in union 
density having a net contractionary effect on public spending? A 
possible explanation that remediates this anomaly with the rest 
of the results is that in the absence of union effects there is a 
disproportionate amount of spending on hospital construction 
and development. As union density increases in a right to work 
state, public expenditures are spread more evenly resulting in a 
negative coefficient on the interaction variable. Such an 
explanation would be in line with the first hypothesis, with union 








Table 1. OLS estimations of state and local public expenditures.
Per Pupil 
Spending
Education Public Welfare Hospital Health Highways
Housing and 
Community Unemployment
Constant 24.3505* 3.0992* 0.1236 0.4699* 1.5446* 0.0220 0.1394*
24.36 14.51 0.76 8.47 11.74 0.48 3.34
DENSITY 0.2438* 0.0435* 0.0198** 0.0073** 0.0278* 0.0128* 0.0019
4.28 3.58 2.14 2.30 3.71 4.94 0.81
RTW -0.7722 0.06 0.8668* 0.0168 0.0453 0.1575* -0.1106*
-0.89 0.32 6.16 0.35 0.40 4.01 -3.07
-0.2423* -0.0775* -0.0251*** -0.0101** 0.0026 -0.0217* 0.0045
-2.71 -4.06 -1.73 -2.04 0.22 -5.34 1.20
GSP -0.00013* -0.000017* -0.000006* -0.000001* -0.000006* 0.000002* -0.000003*
-15.79 -10.07 -4.40 -3.01 -5.52 4.11 -7.67
DEM 3.1602* 1.2953* 0.3230** -0.0035 0.3692* 0.1978* -0.0389
3.98 7.64 2.50 -0.08 3.53 5.48 -1.17
UNEM 0.0637 0.0381** 0.0747* 0.01101** -0.0556 0.0059*** 0.0800*
0.83 2.31 5.94 2.57 -5.48 1.70 24.84
REC -1.447*** 0.1561 0.0015 -0.0182 0.0173 -0.0128 0.3192*
-1.69 0.85 0.01 -0.38 0.15 -0.33 8.92
-0.2185* -0.0979* -0.0239** -0.0031 -0.0494* -0.0129* 0.0047*
-3.64 -7.65 -2.44 -0.92 -6.25 -4.76 1.88
0.0732 -0.0058 -0.0122 -0.0025 0.0048 0.0020 0.0094*
1.33 -0.49 -1.36 -0.81 0.67 0.80 4.08
TIME 0.2827* 0.0465** 0.0213 0.0055 0.0125 0.0016 -0.0493*
3.05 2.35 1.41 1.08 1.02 0.38 -12.75
R2 0.403 0.308 0.31 0.064 0.196 0.182 0.751
SE 3.4567 0.7384 0.5632 0.1918 0.4551 0.1573 0.1443
F 38.82* 25.89* 26.15* 4.84* 14.64* 13.42* 169.83*
n 561 561 561 561 561 561 561
t-statistics below estimated coefficients
*, **, and *** show significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels or greater.














A final interesting finding to note in Table 1 is that the 
interaction between Democratic control and union density 
(except in the area of unemployment) has a negative sign when 
it is significant. This provides a nuanced view of the second 
hypothesis, as it suggests that unions only have a separate, net 
additive effect on three areas. In the presence of a Democratic 
legislature the previous independent effects of unions become 
mired with the effects of the Democratic Party, in a way similar 
to that predicted by the Democratic Coalition school of thought. 
The results of comparing different union effects can be seen 
in Table 2. That multiple differences between proportional union 
effects are statistically significant provides evidence against the 
final hypothesis that unions would spread their influence evenly 
across areas of expenditure. What is interesting is that the 
analyses show that unions are more efficient at affecting some 
areas conceived of as providing non-exclusive benefits such as 
highway construction than they are at influencing areas 
providing exclusive benefits like education or health. This result 
seems to rebuke both the social-interest view of broadly 
interested unions as well as the pluralist view of narrowly self-
interested unions. A possible explanation for this is that the 
amount of influence necessary to change different areas of public 
spending varies, making the standardized effect of general union 
strength a poor measure of how much union influence is being 
applied. Future research along these lines will be needed to come 





Historic trends in union decline only seem to be continuing, 
making an understanding of what their absence will entail even 
more important. Thus, this paper asked the question of how 
union strength affected state and local public expenditures. A 
series of regressions were run to test whether unions had a 
positive impact, whether this impact was independent of 
Democratic Party control, and whether union influence was even 
across areas. The data lends nuanced support to the first two 
hypotheses. In general union strength increased public 
expenditures as social-interest scholars predicted, but in doing 
so evenly it results in situations such as that of hospital spending 
in a right to work state; in such a situation increased union 
density causes disproportionate hospital spending to fall to the 
level of other areas of spending rather than simply increasing it. 
Similarly, union strength demonstrated an expected independent 
effect on public spending in the absence of a fully Democratic 
state government, but in almost all cases the independent 
influence of unions gets mired into Democratic influence when 
that party controls state government. The third hypothesis lead 
to a peculiar conclusion when union effects were not equal across 
areas, but the hierarchy of efficacy in influencing expenditures 
placed non-exclusive areas as the most prioritized. The likely 
explanation for this result is that general union effects were a 
poor model for how unions were using their influence 
proportionately. 
Future research on this subject may wish to take the analysis 
a step further and investigate where this spending was focused 
on in the studied areas. For example, goals of future analyses 
Table 2.  OLS estimations of differences between standardized union effects.







Health 0.0307** 0.0261*** -0.1503*
2.15 1.778 -10.27
Highways 0.1071* 0.1025* -0.0739* 0.0764*
7.69 7.19 -5.08 5.03
0.0051 0.0005 -0.1759* -0.0256*** -0.102
0.36 0.04 -12.2 -1.68 0.02
Unemployment 0.0299** 0.0252** -0.1512* -0.0009 -0.0773* 0.0247**
2.43 2.02 -11.9 -0.07 -5.42 1.84
Columns coded as 0, rows as 1.
t statistics below estimated coefficents
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should explore questions such as does increased expenditure on 
highways result in better wages and safety precautions, more and 
better maintained highways, or both, for example. It might also 
be helpful to take the advice of Burstein and Linton and more 
explicitly attempt to look at union actions and motivations to 
better understand their influence as well as how much is being 
placed towards certain ends. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that union strength has a 
generally positive effect on public expenditures, this effect exists 
both independently of Democratic control and alongside it, and 
that unions do not seem to have a proportionate influence on all 
areas of expenditure. Thus, the historic trend of union decline 
that this paper opened with is likely to result in a lesser amount 
of the social wealth of states going into public expenditures. This 
effect is open to be valued subjectively, but it is an important 
factor to keep in mind when deciding the fate of unions. 
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